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## Upcoming Seminars

### **Monday, 22.6.15**

#### **Departmental Seminar**

17.15-18.45  
AWI 00.010

Topi Miettinen, Hanken School of Economics, Stockholm  
(invited by Christoph Vanberg)  
"Person-Organization Fit and Incentives: A Causal Test"

### **Tuesday, 23.6.15**

#### **Economics & Politics Seminar**

13.30-14.30  
AWI 02.036

Mary Stegmaier, University of Missouri  
"The Effects of Electoral Rules on Parliamentary Behavior:  
A Comparative Analysis of Poland and the Czech Republic"

### **Wednesday, 24.6.15**

#### **Internal Seminar**

12.15-13.15  
AWI 00.010

Katharina Richert  
"Do Development Minister Characteristics Affect Aid  
Giving?"

### Departmental Seminar

Topi Miettinen

"Person-Organization Fit and Incentives: A Causal Test"\*

We investigate the effects of organizational culture and personal values on performance under individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group favoritism that predicts interaction effects between organizational values and personal values in contest games. These predictions are tested in a computerized lab experiment with exogenous control of both organizational values and incentives. In line with our theoretical model we find that prosocial (proself) orientated subjects exert more (less) effort in team contests in the primed prosocial organizational values condition, relative to the neutrally primed baseline condition. Further, when the prosocial organizational values are combined with individual contest incentives, prosocial subjects no longer outperform their proself counterparts. These findings provide a first, affirmative, causal test of person-organization fit theory. They also suggest the importance of a 'triple-fit' between personal preferences, organizational values and incentive mechanisms for prosocially orientated individuals.

\*with Ola Andersson, Marieke Huysentruyt, and Ute Stephan

### Economics & Politics Seminar

Mary Stegmaier

"The Effects of Electoral Rules on Parliamentary Behavior:  
A Comparative Analysis of Poland and the Czech Republic"\*

Do different types of preferential-list PR systems create different incentives for how Members of Parliament vote? To examine this, we compare the quasi-list system of Poland, where only preference votes determine which candidates win seats, to the flexible-list system in the Czech Republic, where the 5% preference vote threshold required to override the party ranking of candidates gives the party greater power in influencing which candidates become MPs. We analyze roll call votes in the 2007-2011 Sejm and the 2010-2013 Czech Chamber of Deputies and, after controlling for party and MP characteristics, we find that in both countries, MPs with lower preference vote shares are more likely to vote along with their party. But, when we compare the strength of this relationship, we observe substantial differences. The magnitude of this relationship in the Czech Republic is ten times stronger than in Poland, as expected due to the more prominent role the electoral rules give to the party.

\*with Kamil Marcinkiewicz and Michael Jankowski

## Internal Seminar

Katharina Richert

"Do Development Minister Characteristics Affect Aid Giving?"\*

Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international development cooperation in OECD countries since the organization started reporting detailed Official Development Assistance (ODA) data in 1967. Does it matter who is in charge of foreign aid? Our study examines whether the personal characteristics of the ministers responsible for development cooperation influence the size and composition of aid budgets. We are interested in the role played by development ministers' gender, political ideology, age, time in office, experience in development cooperation and their educational and professional background. To this end, we create a novel database on development ministers' characteristics for 23 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) over the 1967-2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Specifically, more experienced ministers with respect to their time in office obtain larger aid budgets, and ministers' gender and ideological orientation affect the quality of ODA giving. Overall, however, our results show that ministers' personal characteristics do not matter much. This finding contains a positive message: personal interests do not seem to constitute an impediment to the implementation of aid effectiveness principles.

\*with Andreas Fuchs

## Talks and Research Visits

**Christine Binzel** presented her paper "Does the Arrival of a Formal Financial Institution Alter Informal Sharing Arrangements? Experimental Evidence from Village India" (joint with Erica Field and Rohini Pande) at the Annual Conference of the Research Committee on Development Economics of the German Economic Association, Kiel, June 12-13.

**Jürgen Eichberger** presented his paper "Ambiguity in Games" at the Research Group Workshop "Knightian Uncertainty in Strategic Interactions and Markets" at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZIF), Bielefeld, June 10-13, 2015.

## Miscellaneous

Christine Binzel has been elected member of the Research Committee on Development Economics of the German Economic Association.

**Editorial deadline for issue 16/2015 of the newsletter:  
Wednesday, June 24, 2015, 12 o'clock  
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de**

If you would like to receive the newsletter by email,  
please contact the address above.