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AWI This Week

Monday, 14.5.12

17.15-18.45

AWI 00.010

Departmental Seminar

Carmit Segal, UZH

"Do Female Officers Improve Law Enforcement Quality? "

Tuesday, 15.5.12

14.15-15.15

AWI 02.036

Economics & Politics Seminar

Raji Jayaraman,

European School of Management and Technology

"Productivity Responses to a Contract Change"

Wednesday, 16.5.12

17.15-18.45

AWI 00.010

Departmental Workshop

Hannes Koppel, University of Heidelberg

"Corporate Social Responsibility in the Work Pace - Experimental Evidence on CSR from a Gift-Exchange Game"

Jour Fix

The AWI JOUR FIXE takes place at the Lounge on a weekly basis on Mondays from 16:30 till 17:15 (i.e., just before the departmental seminar). There you will have the opportunity to meet the speaker, enjoy a coffee, and exchange news and discuss research with other members of the AWI.

Departmental Seminar

Carmit Segal

"Do Female Officers Improve Law Enforcement Quality?"*

Law enforcement has historically been a male profession, and it remains so today. Nevertheless, the share of female officers in local police forces has increased dramatically since the late 1970s. This paper examines the relationship between female representation on local police forces and law enforcement quality, by focusing on the rate at which crimes are reported to police, especially crimes against female victims. This measures a key input into the production of law enforcement and also reflects the degree of trust felt by crime victims toward police. Violent crimes against women are thought to be severely under-reported and advocates argue that hiring more female officers, and assigning them to handle these cases, can be an essential strategy for increasing reporting rates and deterring future crimes. Using panel data on local US crime reporting spanning over a decade and a fixed effects regression framework with controls for economic and policy variables, we find that violent crimes against females are significantly more likely to be reported to police when the local police has a greater share of female officers. We find no effect for crimes against males. The increase in female reporting (both absolute and relative to males) is strongest for domestic violence, in which the victim was or had been romantically involved with the attacker. This supports the hypothesis that female officers may be especially effective at increasing the willingness of female victims to report personal crimes that can be especially sensitive to discuss, and in which a fear of retaliation from the attacker is heightened. In contrast to these strong relationships for female representation among police officers, we find no effect from changes in the share of female civilian employees at police departments on crime reporting.

*with Amalia Miller

Economics & Politics Seminar

Raji Jayaraman

"Productivity Responses to a Contract Change"

We exploit a panel data set comprising daily observations on several thousand workers in an Asian tea plantation to examine the effect of a change in incentive pay on productivity. The contract change entailed an increase in the base wage, accompanied by a linear piece-wise incentive scheme "flatter" than the one previously in place. Standard theory suggests that this change should induce lower productivity (kilograms plucked) among plantation workers. In contrast, average productivity increases substantially under the new incentive structure. What is more, it is possible to un-package productivity responses by baseline productivity. The bulk of the increase in productivity is driven by erstwhile low-productivity workers who faced a positive piece rate under the old contract, and a zero piece rate under the new arrangement. In fact, this accounts for all the increase and more: the output of erstwhile high-productivity workers drops significantly after the introduction of the contract change. We argue that the response is consistent with a standards set down by the contract change.

Departmental Workshop

Hannes Koppel

"Corporate Social Responsibility in the Work Place - Experimental Evidence on CSR from a Gift-Exchange Game"

We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers' motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of profits to a charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits given away. Additionally, we investigate the effect of a mission match, i.e., a worker preferring the same charity the firm is actually donating to. Our results show that on average workers reciprocate investments into CSR with increased effort. A mission match does result in higher effort, but only when investment into CSR is high.

Talks and Research Visits

Christina Gathmann gave a talk on "Taxing Childcare: Effects on Family Labor Supply and Children" at the Society of Labor Economists (SOLE), Seventeenth Annual Meetings, Chicago, May 4.

Christian Conrad visited Robert Engle at the Volatility Institute, New York University, April 27-May 02.

Daniel Heyen presented his paper "Information acquisition under Ambiguity - Why the Precautionary Principle may keep us uninformed" (with Timo Goeschl and Boris Wiesenfarth) at the Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Mannheim, April 28.

Benjamin Roth presented the paper "Does Good Advice Come Cheap? – On the Assessment of Risk Preferences in the Lab and the Field" (joint with Andrea Leuermann) at the Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Mannheim, April 26.

New Publications

Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch, Jean-Philipp Lefort: *A Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment*, in *Games and Economic Behavior* 75 (2012), pp. 625-638. DOI information: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.002>

**Editorial deadline for issue 10/2012 of the newsletter:
Wednesday, May 16, 2012, 12 o'clock
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de**

If you would like to receive the newsletter by email,
please contact the address above.