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Sommersemester 2019

Empirische Public Choice

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Vorlesungszeit:	Mittwoch, 9.30-11.45, AWI Raum 00.028 Dienstag, 14.05., 28.5., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010
erste Vorlesung:	Mittwoch, 17.04.2019
keine Vorlesung:	Mittwoch 5.6. und 12.6.
Übung:	Dienstag 23.04., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010 Dienstag 07.05., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010 Dienstag 21.05., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010 Freitag 07.06., 09:00-11:00, AWI Raum 00.010 Dienstag 25.06., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010 Dienstag 02.07., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010 Dienstag 16.07., 16:15-17:45, AWI Raum 00.010
erste Übung:	Dienstag, 23.04.2019
Prüfungsleistung:	120-minütige Klausur, 20 Punkte Zusatzaufgaben in der Übung
Klausurtermine:	Termine werden noch bekannt gegeben
Unterrichtssprache:	Die Vorlesung wird auf Deutsch, die Übung und die Klausur auf Englisch gehalten

Hinweis: Die Vorlesung basiert in großen Teilen auf der Vorlesung „Ökonomische Theorie der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik“ von Prof. Dr. Alois Stutzer, Universität Basel, und in kleinen Teilen auf der Vorlesung „Ökonomische Theorie der Politik“ von Prof. Dr. Helge Berger, Freie Universität Berlin.

Dieser Syllabus ist vorläufig und wird sich noch ändern.

I. Inhalt

Der Ansatz der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie verhilft zu einem besseren Verständnis der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik. Im Zentrum der Veranstaltung stehen die wissenschaftliche Diskussion theoretischer Überlegungen und empirischer Forschungsresultate, sowie der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der politischen Ökonomie.

II. Literatur

Die meisten Themen werden durch das Standardwerk Public Choice III von Dennis Mueller abgedeckt.

Monographie:
*Mueller, Dennis C., 2003, *Public Choice III*, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

III. Ablauf

Teil 1 Politik aus der Perspektive der Politischen Ökonomie

1. Einführung: Public Finance und Public Choice
Frey (1982), Külp (1982), Mueller (2003): Kap. 1

2. Modelle des Regierungsverhaltens
Dreher et al. (2009a), Mueller (2003): Kap. 11-12, Pommerehne (1978)

3. Popularitätsfunktionen und politische Konjunkturzyklen
Alt und Lassen (2006), Brender and Drazen (2008), Jordahl (2006), Mueller (2003): Kap. 19, Reynolds (2014)

Teil 2 Grundlegende politische Institutionen

4. Ökonomische Theorie der repräsentativen Demokratie
Mueller (2003): S. 264-278, Persson und Tabellini (2004), Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003)

5. Ökonomische Theorie der direkten Demokratie
Benz und Stutzer (2004), Frey und Stutzer (2000, 2006), Matsusaka (2005)

6. Ökonomische Theorie des Föderalismus
Frey und Eichenberger (2001), Mueller (2003): Kap. 9-10, Oates (2005)

Teil 3 **Wichtige Akteure im politischen Prozess**

7. Lobbies und Interessengruppen
Luechinger und Moser (2014), Mueller (2003): Kap. 15, 20

8. Bürokratie
Mueller (2003): Kap. 16

Teil 4 **Ausgewählte Aspekte der politischen Ökonomie**

9. Entwicklungshilfe
Dreher, Eichenauer, Gehring (2017), Dreher et al. (2014), Kuziemko und Werker (2006)

10. Internationale Organisationen
Dreher et al. (2009b,c, 2013), Schneider (2013)

11. Korruption
Dreher und Gassebner (2013), Dreher und Rudolph (2011), Rose-Ackerman (2004)

IV. Literaturverzeichnis

Elektronische Dateien der meisten Arbeiten können aus Moodle2 heruntergeladen werden. Weiterführende Literatur wird während der Vorlesung bekannt gegeben.

Acemoglu, Daron, 2005, Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's the Economic Effects of Constitutions, *Journal of Economic Literature* 43, 4: 1025-1048.

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*Alt, James E. and David Dreyer Lassen, 2006, Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries, *American Journal of Political Science* 50, 3: 530-550.

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*Benz, Matthias and Alois Stutzer, 2004, Are voters better informed when they have a larger say in politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland, *Public Choice* 119, 1-2: 31-59.

Berggren, Niclas, Jordahl, Henrik and Panu Poutvaara, 2010, The Looks of a Winner: Beauty, Gender, and Electoral Success, *Journal of Public Economics* 94, 1-2: 8-15.

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