



## Upcoming Seminars

### **Tuesday, 29.1.2019**

#### **Economics and Politics Seminar**

13.45-14.45

Michele Valsecchi, New Economic School, Moscow

AWI 01.030

"Coercive Institutions and Female Empowerment: Legacies of a Colonial Experiment in Java"

### **Wednesday, 30.1.2019**

#### **Internal Seminar**

12.15-13.15

Christopher Kops

AWI 00.010

"Managing Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences"

### **Friday, 1.2.2019**

#### **Special Seminar**

12.15-13.15

Sandro Ambuehl, Toronto University

AWI 00.010

"Projective Paternalism" (invited by Stefan Trautmann)

## Abstracts

### **Economics and Politics Seminar**

Michele Valsecchi

"Coercive Institutions and Female Empowerment: Legacies of a Colonial Experiment in Java"

What are the long-run implications of coercive colonial institutions on female empowerment? In this paper, we study the short- and long-term effects of a colonial experiment - the Dutch Cultivation System on Java (1830-1870) - that forced the native population to switch from subsistence rice production to sugar and coffee cultivation for exports. First, we show that the cultivation of sugar, but not the cultivation of coffee, is associated with stronger historical women empowerment. IV estimates broadly confirm this finding. Second, on the basis of the existing literature, we test whether this institutional shock affected current female empowerment and explore potential mechanisms.

## **Internal Seminar**

Christopher Kops

"Managing Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences"

We develop a dynamic model of individual decision-making in which the decision maker derives utility from physical outcomes as well as from anticipatory beliefs about them, and these two payoff components can interact. Beliefs and behavior are jointly determined in a managing expectations equilibrium by the requirement that behavior must provide at least some support for beliefs. We show that, when beliefs are not observed and no parametric assumptions on utility are made, the managing expectations equilibrium is a consideration set procedure (Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012). We behaviorally characterize this choice procedure. We also highlight the empirical content of the procedure by relating it to both experimental evidence and real world applications.

## **Special Seminar**

Sandro Ambuehl

"Projective Paternalism" \*

We study the positive questions of when, why and how people paternalistically intervene with the choice sets of others. In our laboratory experiment, subjects in the role of Choice Architect decide which bundles, each consisting of a present and future reward, will be available to subjects in the role of Chooser. We find that subjects are paternalistic. They readily eliminate impatient options from Choosers' choice sets, and they do so with the belief that they are furthering the Choosers' own good. In contrast to hypotheses suggested by the behavioral welfare economics literature, more patient Choice Architects impose stricter restrictions, as if projecting their own preferences on others. Projective Paternalism explains additional behavioral patterns we document, such as increased in paternalistic intervention after the introduction of front-end delays in intertemporal choice, and subjects' support for real-world policy proposals.

\*with Douglas Bernheim and Axel Ockenfels

**Editorial deadline for issue 05/2019 of the newsletter:  
Wednesday, January 30, 2019, 12 p.m.  
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de**

If you would like to receive the newsletter by email,  
please contact the address please contact the address above.