

# Newsletter 5/2023

ALFRED-WEBER-INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN BERGHEIMER STR. 58, 69115 HEIDELBERG, TEL. 06221/54-2941 REDAKTION: FREYA SCHADT, EMAIL: NEWSLETTER@AWI.UNI-HEIDELBERG.DE

# **Upcoming Seminars**

### Wednesday, 8.2.23 Internal Seminar

12.15-13.15

AWI room 00.010

Theodoros Alysandratos

"International bribery and local norms: evidence from

a cross-country experiment"

#### **Internal Seminar**

Theodoros Alysandratos

"International bribery and local norms: evidence from a cross-country experiment"

Bribery in international business is common despite its deleterious effect on economic and societal outcomes. A common policy response is the introduction of laws punishing bribing. We study the role of social context in international bribing and the enforcement of those laws. We administer a modified Barr-Serra (2009, 2010) bribery game to participants from nine countries in Africa, America, Asia, and Europe. We elicit social norms using the Krupka-Weber (2013) procedure. We vary the punishment for bribing: in the baseline there is no punishment, in the monitoring treatment a Monitor may choose to report the bribing attempt and then the briber will be punished with a 50:50 chance (between-subject design). We also vary the country where the participants in each group are based (within-subject design). We document that offering a bribe is more socially acceptable than taking one. However, monitoring reduces the social acceptability of bribing. In addition, we uncover regional differences in the norms regarding bribing. In our experimental game bribing is diminished in the monitoring treatment, but only when participants believe that their attempt at bribing will be reported. Participants are more likely to offer a bribe when they believe bribing is more socially acceptable and when they believe that the bribee is more likely to accept the bribe. They are less likely to offer a bribe when the Monitor is located to a country outside their own, with Germany-located Monitors being the most bribereducing ones. We also document an association in our sample between having experience as a public servant and being more tolerant towards bribery. Our results highlight the importance of international monitoring of corruption as well as the need to increase the salience of the enforcement of anti-corruption laws.

## **Talks and Research Visits**

**Sarah Arndt** presented the paper "Shock Transmissions in Different Inflation Regimes" (joint work with Zeno Enders) at the research seminar of the *German Council of Economic Experts*, Wiesbaden, February 1.

**Christoph Vanberg** gave a talk on: "Tough bargaining under unanimity rule: Two modeling approaches and an experiment", at the Economics Research Seminar TU Darmstadt, January 25.

## **New and Leaving Staff**

Katharina Momsen (room 01.006) joins the Chair of Economic Theory II as a PostDoc in February, after working as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, since 9/2017. She obtained her Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Mannheim in 2017. She completed her Master's degree in Economics at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Spain, in 2011, and her Bachelor in Economics at University of Bayreuth, Germany, in 2010. Her research interests lie mainly in experimental and behavioral economics, with applications to environmental economics, industrial organization, and public economics.

