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Upcoming Seminars

Monday, 10.7.2017

Departmental Seminar

17.15-18.15

AWI 00.010

Johanna Mollerstrom, DIW

(invited by Dietmar Fehr)

"No Gender Difference in Willingness to Compete When Competing against Self"

Tuesday, 11.7.2017

Economics and Politics Seminar

13.45-14.45

AWI 01.030

Devi Sridhar, University of Edinburgh

"Global Cooperation in Health: Explaining Shifts Using Principal-Agent Theory"

Wednesday, 12.7.2017

Internal Seminar

12.15-13.15

AWI 00.010

Tobias Pfrommer

"Learning by Negligence - Torts, Experimentation, and the Value of Information"

Wednesday, 12.7.2017

Macro & Econometrics Seminar

14.00-15.00

AWI 01.030

Jonas Dovern & Fabian Krüger

"Modeling Heterogeneity in Macroeconomic Expectations"

Presentation of a Project Plan

Departmental Seminar

Johanna Mollerstrom

"No Gender Difference in Willingness to Compete When Competing against Self"

We report on two experiments investigating whether there is a gender difference in the willingness to compete against oneself (self-competition), similar to what is found when competing against others (other-competition). In one laboratory and one online market experiment, involving a total of 1,200 participants, we replicate the gender-gap in willingness to other-compete but find no evidence of a gender difference in the willingness to self-compete. We explore the roles of risk and confidence and suggest that these factors can account for the different findings. Finally, we document that self-competition does no worse than other-competition in terms of performance boosting.

Economics and Politics Seminar

Devi Sridhar

"Global Cooperation in Health: Explaining Shifts Using Principal-Agent Theory"

The past few decades have seen a massive increase in the number of international organisations focusing on global health including the rise of public-private partnerships (PPPs), where private non-governmental organisations, for-profit enterprises, and various other social entrepreneurs work hand-in-hand with governments to combat specific maladies. Why has this model gained popularity in recent years? And what are the consequences of this shift? To address these questions, this talk will use principal-agent theory, in which governments are the principals directing international agents of various types, to take a closer look at two major PPPs, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and the GAVI Alliance, and two major traditional international organisations, The World Health Organisation and the World Bank.

Internal Seminar

Tobias Pfrommer

"Learning by Negligence - Torts, Experimentation, and the Value of Information"

How should and does tort law deal with uncertain risks emerging from novel technologies? While the law-and-economics literature on learning mainly favors strict liability, the law in the US and the EU often favors negligence rules or provides state-of-the-art defenses for novel and uncertain risks. We show that when post-market learning is an essential part of a novel technology's risk assessment and provides information about uncertain risks to other potential injurers, negligence rules and state-of-the-art regimes can welfare-dominate strict liability. We interpret the departure from strict liability as a discount on the novel technology's risk externality which the law offers to potential injurers. This discount can enable some potential injurers to experiment with the novel technology, thereby creating public information about the technology's risks. 'Experimentation regimes' (like negligence rules or state-

of-the-art defenses) can outperform strict liability, but may also be detrimental to welfare, if they implement too much experimentation. When experimentation is socially desirable, experimentation regimes are therefore most likely to be superior to strict liability if they implement only modest amounts of experimentation.

Talks and Research Visits

At the DIAL Conference on Development Economics University of Paris-Dauphine, June 29-30, the following papers were presented: **Gerda Asmus**: "Is Targeted Aid More Effective? Sector-specific needs, the composition of aid and its effects on growth" (joint with Axel Dreher and Peter Nunnenkamp); **Valentin Lang**: "Room for Discretion? Biased Decision Making in International Financial Institutions" (joint with Andrea Presbitero); **Sarah Langlotz**: "Farming or fighting? Opium cultivation and the geography of conflict in Afghanistan" (joint work with Kai Gehring and Stefan Kienberger); **Angelika Müller**: "Aid donors" (joint with Andreas Fuchs).

Sarah Langlotz presented the paper "Farming or fighting? Opium cultivation and the geography of conflict in Afghanistan" (joint work with Kai Gehring and Stefan Kienberger) at the 17th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference, Antwerp, June 26-28.

Valentin Lang presented his paper "The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The Effect of IMF Programs on Inequality" at the Conference of the European Political Science Association (EPSA), in Milan, Italy, on June 22-24.

Editorial deadline for issue 19/2017 of the newsletter:
Wednesday, July 12, 2017, 12 p.m.
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de

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