



ALFRED-WEBER-INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN
BERGHEIMER STR. 58, 69115 HEIDELBERG, TEL. 06221/54-2941, FAX: 06221/54-3592
REDAKTION: FREYA SCHADT, EMAIL: NEWSLETTER@AWI.UNI-HEIDELBERG.DE

AWI This Week

Monday, 10. 01. 11

Departmental Seminar 1

17.15-18.45

AWI 00.010

Klaus Ritzberger, University of Vienna

"Strategic Games Beyond Expected Utility"

Wednesday, 12. 01. 11

Departmental Seminar 2

17.15-18.45

AWI 00.010

Joel van de Weele, University of Frankfurt

"Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment"

Jour Fixe

The AWI JOUR FIXE takes place at the Lounge on a weekly basis on Mondays from 16:30 till 17:15 (i.e., just before the departmental seminar). There you will have the opportunity to meet the speaker, enjoy a coffee, and exchange news and discuss research with other members of the AWI.

Departmental Seminar 1

Klaus Ritzberger

"Strategic Games Beyond Expected Utility"*

This paper argues that Nash equilibrium is a solution where all strategic uncertainty has been resolved and, therefore, inappropriate to model situations that involve "ambiguity". Instead, to capture what players will do in the presence of some strategic uncertainty, takes a solution concept that is closed under best replies. It is shown that such a solution concept, fixed sets under the best reply correspondence, exists for a class of games significantly wider than those games for which generalizations of Nash equilibrium exist. In particular, this solution can do without the expected utility hypothesis.

*with Thomas Jungbauer

Departmental Seminar 2

Joel van de Weele

"Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment"*

Sanctions are a means to provide incentives towards more pro-social behavior. Yet their implementation can be a signal that past behavior was undesirable. We investigate experimentally the importance of the informational content of the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who takes the role of a fictitious policy maker or manager with superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which eliminates for them the incentive effect of sanctions.

*with Roberto Galbiati and Karl Schlag

New and Leaving Staff

We are very happy to announce that Christoph Brunner (previously a post-doc at the AWI) has accepted an offer of a junior professorship in Microeconomics at the AWI. He has taken up the position on January 1, 2011.



On January 1, 2011 Hela Maafi is taking up a postdoc position at the AWI. Hela has just received her Ph.D. from the Paris School of Economics (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne). Her fields of interest are behavioral economics, decision making, and experimental economics.



We are very happy to announce that Zeno Enders (University of Bonn) has accepted an offer of a W3-professorship in Economic Policy at the Alfred-Weber-Institute. He will take up the position in fall 2011. The position was previously held by Andreas Irmen.

**Editorial deadline for issue 02/2011 of the newsletter:
Wednesday, January 12, 2011, 12 o'clock
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de**

If you would like to receive the newsletter by email,
please contact the address above