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AWI This Week

Monday, 30. 11. 09 Departmental Seminar

17.15-18.45	Sebastian Kranz
AWI 00.010	"On Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring and Side Payments "

Wednesday, 2. 12. 09 Internal Seminar

17.15-18.45	Christiane Schwieren
AWI 00.010	"Personality and Behavior in Economic Games"

Friday, 4. 12. 09 Job Talk

14.00-15.15	Hartmut Egger
AWI 0.1.034	"Warum zahlen multinationale Unternehmen höhere Löhne"
15.30-16.45	Ingo Geishecker
AWI 0.1.034	"Offshoring, Tasks and the Skill Wage Pattern"

Departmental Seminar

Sebastian Kranz

"On Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring and Side Payments" *

This paper studies general infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and side payments. We show that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented by a simple class of optimal stationary equilibria. For both cases of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, we develop quick algorithms that exactly compute the sets of public perfect equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. Several examples illustrate that optimal stationary equilibria can have a very intuitive and simple form.

* with Susanne Ohlendorf

Internal Seminar

Christiane Schwieren

"Personality and Behavior in Economic Games"

Behavioral and experimental economists have shown that people consistently deviate from game theoretic predictions when playing games such as a trust game or an ultimatum game. Recently, some economists have started to look at personality variables as potential explanatory variables for behavior in games. We measured personality traits in a large sample of subjects and had them play different games in a row. This allows us to test whether certain personality variables enable us to predict behavior consistently in different games and help to categorize heterogeneity found, based on standard accepted personality constructs. Basing explanations for behavior in economic games on personality constructs instead of just forming "types" or using risk attitude as an explanatory variable should allow us to make more precise predictions beyond what we can predict from knowing someone's risk attitude. We discuss whether this is in fact the case and whether therefore assessing personality measures adds something important to the analysis of economic behavior in games

Talks and Research Visits

Timo Goeschl was invited by the Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods to visit the institute in Bonn last week as a guest researcher. On November 24, he presented recent empirical research of the ECOCRIME research group at the Bonn, "Law and Economics" Seminars.

New Publications

Lämmlin, B./Wilhelmy, St. (2009): Cooperación descentralizada alemana del desarrollo - El rol de los gobiernos locales. In: ANUARIO Observatorio de la Cooperación Descentralizada 2008, Montevideo: Observatorio de Cooperación Descentralizada UE-AL, 2009.

**Editorial deadline for issue 29/2009 of the newsletter:
Wednesday, December 2, 2009, 12 o'clock
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de**

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please contact the address above.