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Pretending to be the Good Guy. How to Increase ODA Inflows while Abusing Human Rights

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Abstract: I investigate the effect of ratification of different human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on Official Development Assistance (ODA) by donors of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). On average the ratification of an additional human rights treaty increases total ODA by 6% (around 33.5 million USD) and the ratification of one of the two most important treaties, on torture and civil and political rights, increases total ODA by up to 19% (around 97million USD). Additionally I show that countries with low human rights compliance can use treaty ratification as a substitute for actual improvements in their protection of human rights. While ratification of the two most important treaties does not increase ODA for countries with low levels of respect for human rights, it increases aid commitments for those countries with the lowest respect for human rights by almost 42%. This pattern does not significantly differ between the Nordic donors and the five most important DAC donors. The results become stronger when taking possible endogeneity of treaty ratification into account.

Keywords: aid allocation; human rights; UN treaties

JEL codes: F35, F53, K33

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I. Introduction

Since the adoption of the Declaration of the Human Rights in 1948, numerous conventions focusing on different aspects of human rights have been approved by the members of the United Nations (UN). Although today a pool of widely accepted rules of human rights protection exists – 27 conventions, amendments and optional protocols are listed under the Human Rights Chapter in the United Nations Treaty Database – human rights abuses around the world continue to be reported on an almost daily basis. Apparently international commitment to human rights has not caused a corresponding increase in the protection of these rights.

Indeed, many studies have analyzed whether international human rights treaties (HRT) change the behavior of ratifying states – with an overall sobering result (e.g., Hathaway, 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007, Neumayer, 2005). On the one hand, states with a strong civil society and a democratically accountable government show improvements in their respect for human rights after the ratification of international human rights conventions (Neumayer, 2005). On the other hand, those states with oppressive governments – where a change in attitude would be most needed – fail to adjust their behavior (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007). This suggests that countries ratify these international laws without the intent or possibility of compliance.

Consequentially the question arises: Why do countries actually sign these conventions? Apparently, benefits must be connected with treaty ratification that convince countries to ratify even if their intrinsic motivation is low. One reason might be peer pressure and the threat of a loss of reputation by being one of the few who do not commit to a convention (Guzman, 2002, Hill, 2010). However it is questionable whether oppressive regimes are motivated by this sort of peer pressure or threat of reputation loss. Hathaway (2007) argues that apart from intrinsic motivation there are some collateral consequences that influence a country's decision to ratify HRTs. Examples are foreign trade, FDI and aid. Especially in the context of the barely enforceable HRTs (Hafner-Burton, 2005) the expectation of additional monetary benefits seems a valid argument for ratification.

Though the general relationship between human rights abuse and ODA has been analyzed in the literature,[2] the effect of human rights treaty ratification on ODA – which might be a strong pecuniary incentive for ratification – has until recently been neglected in empirical studies.[3] In the following I am going to focus on this aspect and discuss two questions. First, do DAC donors consider a country's ratification of international human rights treaties in their aid allocation decision? Second, is ratification of international HRTs a complement to or a substitute for actual respect for human rights at home? Though the first question is of interest as it analyzes the question why countries ratify international human rights treaties in general, the second question is even more important due to its high policy relevance. Empirical studies have shown that countries with low democratic standards do not usually comply with their international commitment to human rights (Neumayer, 2005, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007). If treaty ratification is seen as a substitute for actual good behavior, DAC donors would risk rewarding those countries that have a low reputation of human rights protection for their most likely purported commitment to international law. Consequently, countries that pretend to comply would benefit more than countries that in fact have a better human rights record. In so doing, donors might achieve exactly the opposite of what they intended and support oppressive regimes that are not intending to make a real change.

The results of my study (presented in section V) suggest that countries are actually rewarded for their international commitment to human rights. Ratification of the two most central conventions, the *International Convention on Civil and Political Rights* and the *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* seems to matter most. The ratification of one additional convention of this group is rewarded with an increase in ODA of 11 - 19%. Further, I show that international commitment is most probably seen as a substitute to actual good behavior. Those countries with the highest level of human rights abuses benefit most from ratifying international treaties. Countries in a situation where political terror, including torture, murder and disappearances are a part of daily life can increase their ODA by around 18.5% on average by ratifying an additional

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[2] For example on US aid allocation by Poe and Sirirangsi (1994), Apodaca and Stohl (1999) and Demirell-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009), on general bilateral and multilateral aid by Neumayer (2003a, 2003b), Carey (2007) and Nielsen (2013), and on the relationship between resolutions against human rights violators and aid, Voeten and Lebovic (2007).

[3] I am aware of only one recently published study by Magesan (2013) to which I refer below. There is also some ongoing research by Nielsen and Simmons (2012) and Hawkins and Goodliffe (2012).

core human rights treaty. When analyzing the most important DAC donors and the so-called like-minded donors separately, their behavior appears to be very similar. Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden clearly follow the substitution pattern. For Denmark and France the behavior seems to be similar however the results are not statistically significant. Only the United States and Japan differ in their behavior. The results suggest that ratification of international human rights treaties is an unimportant factor for the United States in their allocation decision independently of the domestic level of political terror. Japan, on the other hand, values international commitment but only as a complement to factual domestic respect for human rights.

The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section II discusses the literature on commitment to human rights treaties and how foreign aid allocation is related to respect for human rights. Section III presents the estimation strategy and section IV the data used. In section V, I present and discuss the findings of my analysis. Finally section VI provides a conclusion and discusses the policy implications drawn from the presented findings.

II. Human Rights Commitment and Aid

Since the end of the Second World War the number of international conventions on human rights together with the number of states ratifying them has steadily increased. In the UN treaty database[4] a total of sixteen conventions are listed which are further extended by additional protocols and amendments. The rights covered within these treaties range from the prevention of genocide and the rights for different groups such as women, children or migrants to the general protection and provision of civil and political rights. After a treaty is adopted by the UN General Assembly, member states have the option to sign and then ratify it. In general, signing a treaty is a non-binding action that shows a willingness to commit to the agreed standards in the future. For a convention to become legally binding, a state has to ratify the convention. The same degree of formal commitment involves accession or succession to a treaty.[5] In the following I will only use the term ratification, referring to ratification, succession and accession alike. Though ratification signals a legally binding commitment

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[4] I will focus in my study only on the conventions adopted by the United Nations as they can be ratified by all UN members alike.

[5] Accession is the ratification after the convention has already entered into force and succession applies to countries that emanate from another state that has ratified the treaty previously.

to a treaty, the enforcement measures are weak with regards to UN human rights conventions (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Usually a supervisory body is established that monitors the implementation of the respective convention based on regular implementation reports of the ratifying countries.[6] In addition, individuals can report misbehavior of their government to the supervisory body if the government does not comply with a ratified convention. However there is no sanctioning mechanism to enforce the implementation.[7]

This lack of enforcement might be one reason why, despite these numerous treaties, human rights abuses are still regularly reported. The persistent occurrence of human rights violations suggests that either international commitment to human rights has not changed the behavior of committing governments or that those countries that abuse human rights simply prefer to not ratify these treaties. A look at the list of committing countries clearly shows that the latter does not hold. The *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (CAT)*,* for example, was ratified by 46 countries who had at the time of ratification a political terror score of 3 or worse (Figure 1) which means that at least "…extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment […] Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted." (Gibney et al., 2013).

For 47 countries that ratified the CAT, torture was practiced frequently at the time of ratification (Figure 1). Vreeland (2008) also shows that among dictators, those who use torture are actually more likely to join the CAT than those who do not use torture. He argues that torture is more common in multi-party systems and governments in these systems need to make some concession to their opponents, where the ratification of the CAT might be a less binding one. Accordingly the probability to sign, accede or ratify the *International Convention on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) and/or the CAT is almost the same between human rights repressors and protectors (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007). These findings suggest that the missing improvement in human rights

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[6] See information on the tasks of the human rights treaty bodies provided by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/TBStrengthening.aspx) .

[7] There is a debate in political and law science whether sanctions are needed with respect to international human right laws because they lack inherent material incentives for the implementing state. The counter-argument is that sanctions and thus coercion of these norms would derogate the actual willingness to commit to human rights and the implicit change in belief of oppressive regimes (see Hafner-Burton (2005) for an overview).

protection is not due to an adverse selection to treaty ratification but due to a lack of compliance with the content of these rules.

Political and law scientists have intensively studied the questions of who ratifies HRTs and what determines their compliance (e.g., Hathaway, 2002, 2007, Powell and Staton, 2009, Conrad, 2013). This literature suggests that formal commitment to international conventions does not necessarily change a state's behavior. In contrast, countries ratifying international human rights conventions often show even lower compliance with the respective rights than countries that do not ratify (Hathaway, 2002). However the changes in governments' behavior are not homogenous between different HRTs. According to a study by Hill (2010), the ratification has a positive impact on the respect for women's rights in the case of the *Convention Against Discrimination of Women Rights,* while countries ratifying the CAT are even more likely to use torture and deteriorate their behavior.

The decision to commit to an international treaty depends on both the will of the executives as well as the power of civil society and the legislatures at home. In the case countries face a strong legislative that does not share their view on protecting human rights, the commitment to an international convention can be used as an instrument to force the legislative to introduce the respective laws (Hathaway, 2007). On the other hand if the executives do not want to comply with international standards, a powerful legislature could prevent the executives from ratifying international treaties (Conrad, 2013). This also applies if executives face a strong civil society at home who might hold them accountable for their international commitments (Neumayer 2005, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). Consequently, executives that are unsure about their ability to comply with the international commitment will not ratify a convention especially if they are confronted with a strong civil society or legislatures at home. On the other hand, if the pressure at home is not intense, the executives can commit to the treaty without fearing enforcement pressure due to the international community lacking a real enforcement mechanism (as mentioned previously). Yet, Hathaway's approach does not explain why we observe countries that, despite their bad record of human rights violations, ratify UN conventions and do not subsequently change their behavior. Hathaway mentions some further considerations such as FDI, trade and aid, but she does not empirically test whether these factors have an influence on treaty ratification.

In fact, foreign aid might be a strong argument in a developing country's decision of whether or not to ratify HRTs. Many donors claim that human rights protection is one aspect they consider in their aid allocation decision and several studies have analyzed to what extent political, civil and human rights influence this bilateral aid allocation decision (e.g., Poe and Sirirangsi, 1994, Svensson, 1999, Neumayer, 2003a, 2003b). Most of them conclude that respect for these rights is more important for the general decision of whether or not to give aid to a certain country ("gatekeeping stage") and less so for the question of how much aid a country receives. Neumayer (2003a) finds the role of human rights in total bi- and multilateral aid allocation to be relatively minor compared to other indicators like colonial past or need. Nevertheless, human rights seem to play an important role in the allocation decision for some donors, e.g., Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Svensson, 1999). In a recent study, Nielsen (2013) finds that the effect of human rights violations on aid decisions might be more complex than previously shown. He argues that the importance of human rights for aid allocation depends on the recipient's political importance to the donor as well as on the importance of human rights violations to the general public. Consequently, political allies are less likely to be punished for human rights violations than non-allies. Additionally, donors react to external pressure – such as media coverage of human rights abuses by a certain regime – and reduce aid allocation to the repressive country (Nielsen, 2013).

Given that donors take the actual human rights situation into account it is likely that they also consider HRT ratification and reward countries that commit to these treaties. As treaty ratification can be monitored easily it might even be a preferred indicator for the aid bureaucracy. Donors might take participation in HRTs as a reliable signal for the willingness of countries to improve their human rights behavior and reward the governments for changing their perception of this issue. Looking from a political economy perspective, the treaty ratification indicator could also be useful in another way. Special political or commercial interests in countries with a bad human rights reputation make it difficult for donors to defend aid payments towards its citizens and especially domestic civil society organizations. However if the country has signed important human rights treaties, the donor can argue that the recipient government is at least willing to change its behavior and this willingness should be rewarded. For the recipient country, on the other hand, the economic benefit of increased bilateral aid

is a reasonable incentive to ratify HRTs. Given that committing to these international treaties comes at low costs, ratifying HRTs is an easy way for a government to improve its image. This is of special interest for governments that are known as having a history of human rights violations. Possibly, the donor perceives ratification even as a promise for behavioral change and values the treaty ratification more than the actual behavior. In this case HRT ratification serves as a substitute for actual good behavior.

In the following, I will analyze weather i) DAC donors give more aid to countries that show a higher commitment in terms of international HRT ratification and ii) whether HRT ratification is in the eyes of the donors a substitute or a complement to a country's actual human rights behavior. Treaty ratification would be a complement if donors reward it in cases where the country already shows a certain respect for human rights at home. HRT ratification would be seen as a substitute when donors reward countries for their international commitment despite a situation of frequent human rights abuses at home.

III. Estimation Strategy

My estimation strategy is a panel fixed-effects model covering the years 1977 – 2010 and up to 136 countries. I use a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation.[8] The list of countries are those that are both an ODA eligible country, as defined by the OECD DAC's Part I List, and a member of the UN and therefore able to ratify HRTs. The estimation model to evaluate the effect of HRT ratification on ODA is:

$$(1) \quad Log\ ODA_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 HRT_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 HR_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 X_{i,t-1} + \gamma_t + \delta_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

All control variables relating to country i, treaty ratification (HRT), the recipient country's human rights situation at home (HR) and a set of additional control variables (X), are lagged by one period to account for the time needed to acquire information that can be used in aid allocation decisions.[9] Country (δ_i) and year fixed effects (γ_t) are included to control for time-invariant country

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[8] The results are robust to using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood method.
[9] As a sensitivity analysis three year averages have been used, following Neumayer (2003). The results are robust to this change.

characteristics and time-specific effects that affect all recipients in one year, e.g., a general decrease in aid commitments during times of economic crisis.

The monetary incentive for developing countries to ratify human rights treaties has been neglected in the literature so far. To the best of my knowledge, only one study by Magesan (2013) investigates this question.[10] However, Magesan uses aid disbursements as the dependent variable and thereby disregards two possible problems. First, disbursements depend not only on the situation in the recipient country at time t or t-1 but also on previous commitment decisions. It is therefore difficult to identify the right timing of the control variables to explain the disbursement decision. The second possible disadvantage is reverse causality. It is imaginable that the ODA disbursement is conditional on ratifying certain international human rights treaties. I circumvent these problems by using aid commitments and additionally test the robustness of my results by instrumenting treaty ratification. A second amendment of my study is the investigation of the relationship between ratification of HRTs, domestic respect for human rights and aid flows as I will discuss below.

In a first step I will analyze how treaty ratification matters for DAC donors' aid allocation decisions. Based on this analysis I want to focus on the question whether rulers in developing countries can use these international treaties as a supplement for real respect for human rights. This would suggest that countries with a bad reputation in terms of human rights protection at home can "polish" their image by ratifying HRTs and thereby increase their aid inflows. The alternative would be that HRT ratification is a complement to actual behavior and only matters if a recipient also keeps a certain standard of actual human rights protection. This question is of high policy relevance as previous studies have shown that governments with a high level of political terror do not change their behavior following ratification of HRTs. Treaty ratification as a substitute for actual "good" behavior would imply that donors support these regimes which undermines donors' stated intent to improve the governance in recipient countries. To examine this question I will use an interaction between the treaty ratification measure and the actual situation of human rights protection:

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[10] Magesan finds evidence that DAC aid increases after a country commits to international HRTs. As his group of human rights treaties differs from the one I analyze and he further measures treaty ratification as the behavioral distance between a country *i*'s ratification behavior and the distance weighted behavior of all countries except *i*. Our specifications therefore differ substantially which is why I do not use his set-up as a baseline.

$$(2) \ \text{Log ODA}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{HRT}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \text{HR}_{t-1} + \beta_3 \text{HRT}_{t-1} * \text{HR}_{t-1} + \beta_4 X_{t-1} + \gamma_t + \delta_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical studies do not find much evidence for selectivity of bilateral aid donors with respect to institutional settings (e.g., Dollar and Levin, 2006). Accordingly, if donors do not take general institutional changes into account in their allocation decision, the risk of an omitted variable bias due to some institutional change that simultaneously influences both the decision to commit to international HRTs and the aid decision is low. Further, I reduce the risk of reverse causality in both models by the choice of the dependent variable, as aid commitments are less likely to be conditional on certain behavior like ratification of HRTs than disbursements.

Nevertheless I will show the robustness of my results to the application of an IV regression to further address potential endogeneity. For this purpose I will instrument the ratification of HRTs using a spatial lag variable that weights the ratification behavior of all other countries by their distance to the respective recipient (Neumayer and Plümper, 2010) as well as a country's ratifying behavior with respect to a different but comparable set of treaties. The first instrument assumes that neighboring countries' ratification behavior affects the behavior of recipient *i*. This assumption is based on the theory of Elkins and Simmons (2005), among others, and empirical evidence that shows governments are influenced in their decision making by the behavior of neighboring states. This finding holds true for several different types of government decisions. Examples include when adopting economic reforms (Gassebner et al., 2011) or human trafficking policies (Cho et al., 2013). This spatial effect is arguably exogenous to the decision of aid commitments to country *i* as country i's ODA should not depend on the behavior of other countries.[11] The second instrument I use is a country's ratification of a set of six treaties listed under the "penal matters" chapter in the UN treaties database. These treaties include, for example, the *Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery* and the *Convention*

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[11] One could argue that ODA allocation might be regionally clustered. In this case it is possible that aid to country *i* depends on the ratifying behavior of other countries in the region. If other countries receive more aid because they ratify many HRTs, the aid to country *i* would decrease if there is a preset budget for the region. In this case I would underestimate the effect of treaty commitments. However it is questionable that a reduction (increase) of aid to several countries within one region automatically leads to an increase (reduction) of aid to other countries of the region in order to keep the regional budget stable irrespective of the usability of new funds in these countries. Furthermore the distance weighted measure correctly mirrors a preset geographical region by the donor only for those countries in the center of this preset region. For a country at the boarder of a donor set region, the behavior of neighboring countries that belong to a different donor set region would have an important influence on its behavior. However, as they belong to a different donor region their behavior does not influence the regionally fixed aid budget

on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.[12] Treaties in this chapter also cover security aspects and their content is therefore to a certain extent similar to the treaties in the human rights chapter. Presumably a country's ratification behavior of these two chapters is alike. On the other hand cover these treaties more abstract security aspects and not specific personal rights, with the exception of the UN personnel's safety. It is therefore unlikely that donors are equally sensitive to the ratification of these treaties with respect to the HRTs. This is supported by the lack of these treaties' explanatory power for the dependent variable when included directly in the ODA estimation.

IV. Data

The dependent variable I use is DAC donors' total aid commitment in year t to recipient i in logarithms.[13] This information is provided by the OECD's International Development Statistics. Given that the total size of ODA commitments is the outcome variable it is important to control for the size of the recipient country by including total population as a control variable. Following the previous literature on aid allocation, I include GDP per capita to measure the recipient's need. This measure is highly correlated with other social needs measures like child mortality or literacy and has the advantage of being more widely available compared to these measures (Neumayer, 2003a). In addition, given that the level of democracy and other state characteristics are arguably good predictors of the probability that a country will ratify human rights treaties (Hathaway, 2007) and donor countries claim to reward democratic behavior, it is important to control for democracy. Otherwise, treaty ratification might capture effects that reflect the institutional quality of the recipient. I use Polity IV's polity2 measure (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003) imputed with freedom house's civil liberties measure (Teorell et al., 2011) to control for the political situation in the recipient country. The imputed measure has more observations than the original polity2 data and, according to Hadenius and Teorell (2005), is more reliable than the original polity2 index. To control for the donor's geo-strategic interests, the recipient's voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) is included. I use voting in line with

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[12] An overview of the included treaties can be found in the appendix.
[13] The log is taken after adding 1 to the commitments in order to keep observations where the ODA commitments are zero.

the G5[14] to proxy general alliance with the DAC countries as the G5 are the biggest DAC donors. It is likely that countries that vote in line with the major bilateral donors are also more likely to sign international HRTs due to similar human rights protection preferences. The effect of UNGA voting and general political alliance could in this case be attributed to ratification when voting behavior is not controlled for.

Following the convention in the literature I take two alternative measures of human rights practices: the political terror scale (PTS, 2012) and the physical integrity index (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). The political terror scale measures the violation of physical integrity rights in different countries around the world. The rights covered in this measure are those basic human rights that are enforceable by the government and do not depend on the general level of development (Neumayer, 2003b). Both Amnesty International and the US State Department provide this index. I use the average measure of both indices combined.[15] The political terror scale ranges from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the worst form of political terror where "*Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness.*" (PTS, 2012). The alternative measure, the physical integrity index provided by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) is a combined measure reflecting a country's situation with regards to the use of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance. The indicator ranges from 0 to 8, where a score of 8 indicates highest respect for physical integrity. These measures of actual respect for human rights allow me to investigate the question whether human rights treaties are a substitute or complement to actual respect for human rights. Further, they account for a possibly different ratification behavior between human rights abusers and protectors.

Finally the main variable of interest is the ratification of HRTs. The commitment to international human rights treaties is measured with a simple count of the number of UN HRTs that a country has signed. The United Nations' treaty collection lists 27 conventions, amendments and optional protocols under the chapter *human rights*.[16] The first crude measure codes the ratification of

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[14] Voting in line with the G5 is measured as the average of voting in line with the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France based on the data provided by Dreher and Sturm (2012).

[15] The results are robust to using the measure provided by the US State Department or by Amnesty International respectively.

[16] See the UN Treaties Database, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en

all of these elements (*human rights treaties*).[17] However as this list includes treaties which are probably not equally important with respect to basic human rights, e.g., the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports versus the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In a second step I reduce the list of instruments therefore to the nine core treaties (*core treaties*) according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[18] As a third indicator the list of human rights treaties is further reduced to the two most important human rights measures according to the vast literature on human rights (see, e.g., Hathaway, 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007), the *International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (*CAT*) and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)*. I thus restrict my choice of human rights treaties to only those that are internationally recognized as being so.[19] I use a simple count of the number of treaties ratified as I assume that these treaties have an absolute value to donor countries. This approach differs from the one of the existing study by Magesan (2013) that uses the difference between the number of treaties ratified by country *i* and the distance-weighted average ratification of all countries excluding country *i*.

V.   Results

Table 1 shows the results for the basic fixed-effects regression. GDP per capita has a significantly negative effect on ODA commitments since the recipient's need for foreign aid reduces with rising GDP per capita. In addition, the statistically significant and positive coefficient of polity suggests that more democratic countries, on average, receive more aid. Accordingly, countries that can improve their polity score by one unit receive on average around 4% more ODA. As the political terror scale and the physical integrity index both measure human rights abuses in the recipient country, they are

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[17] As many ratifications took place at the end of the year, as a robustness check I coded conventions as having being ratified in year t only if it was done so before July of the respective year.

[18] These are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx.

[19] In contrast, Magesan (2013) also includes some treaties that belong to other categories like cultural matters. I prefer staying strictly to this international nomenclature so as to avoid being arbitrary with regards to the choice of the analyzed treaties.

included separately. Throughout all models both measures are statistically significant at least at the five percent level. This suggests that the DAC donors consider the human rights situation in the recipient country when allocating their aid. While the literature so far has identified only a weak effect of human rights on the allocation of aid (Neumayer, 2003a, 2003b) or an influence depending on the political importance of the recipient country towards the donor (Nielsen, 2013) my results show a stable and quantitatively important effect. An increase of political terror by one unit, which is equivalent to one standard deviation in the sample, reduces ODA commitments on average by more than 9% which equals around 45.5 million USD (which is approximately equal to the total ODA to Costa Rica in 2009). This is an economically relevant size. On the other hand a country that manages to increase its respect for physical integrity rights by two units, which is again about equivalent to a one standard deviation, receives an increase in committed aid by almost 7% on average (almost 31 million USD).

The coefficients for treaty ratification indicate how DAC donors react towards normative or, to use a more provocative phrase, *symbolic* respect for human rights. Models two and three include the most general measure for human rights treaties, namely all elements included under the chapter "Human Rights" in the UN treaty collection database. In both specifications the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. However the narrower measure, which only captures treaties classified as core treaties with regards to respect for human rights, is statistically significant at the five percent level in model four. This suggests that ratifying an additional core treaty leads, on average, to a 6% rise in ODA. In model five, where the physical integrity index is used instead, the measure is again not significant at conventional levels. However data for the physical integrity index are only available for a shorter period (since 1981), therefore the number of observations reduces substantially. The narrowest measure, capturing only the ratification of the ICCPR and the CAT, is significant in both models and shows the largest coefficient compared to the measures analyzed before. Further, the indicator for all other core treaties except ICCPR and CAT is not significant at conventional levels. It seems that these two conventions are indeed the most important for DAC donors. Ratification of one of these treaties increases the average ODA commitment by 11 - 19% which is equivalent to an

increase in ODA of 58 – 97 million USD. Given that ratifying these treaties comes at low real costs, as their implementation is not enforced, the benefit a country can gain by ratification is substantial.

Interestingly, the two measures for the domestic human rights situation stay significant even after the inclusion of the treaty measures. This shows that both factors are of importance for the donor's decision. Therefore in the second step I analyze the relationship between these two measures asking the question whether the importance of international commitment depends on the actual respect for human rights at home, i.e. whether international commitment is a complement or a substitute to actual respect for human rights. Donors might assume that governments change their behavior and want to reward countries who signal their willingness to improve human rights standards by treaty ratification. Given the sobering empirical evidence however it is most likely that this wish, at least in non-democratic countries with a record of human rights violation, does not come true. If the aim is to reward human rights protection, treaty ratification should only be rewarded when it complements a state's actual behavior.

Table 2 shows the results for the interaction of treaty ratification with the two measures of respect for and abuse of human rights respectively. For the political terror scale, an increase signifies an increase in human rights abuse while an increase in the physical integrity measure means that human rights are less abused. The results show two important things. First, the interaction is in almost all models statistically significant at least at the five percent level. In terms of ODA allocation decisions, this indicates the existence of an interaction of treaty ratification with the extent of the actual respect for human rights. Second, the signs of the coefficients indicate that treaty ratification has a stronger positive effect on ODA allocation if the actual protection of human rights in the recipient country is lower. This becomes clearer when we examine the marginal effect of treaty ratification at different levels of political terror and physical integrity graphically in Figures A 2 – A 4. For lower values of the political terror scale – situations where the government respects human rights – the ratification of human rights treaties has no additional effect on ODA commitments. However once the threshold of three in the political terror scale is reached, which corresponds to a situation where extensive political imprisonment occurs and "[…] execution or other political murders and

brutality may be common […]" (Gibney et al., 2013), the ratification of human rights treaties increases ODA commitments. This pattern indicates a substitution effect.

Those countries with high political terror benefit from increased ODA by ratifying international treaties. The histogram included in the figures shows that it is not only a small number of countries that have this high political terror scale indicating that the result refers to a relevant share of countries. While countries with a terror scale of three cannot increase their aid with an average number of treaty ratifications (around six treaties/protocols), for the same amount of ratified treaties countries with a terror scale of six receive on average 12% more ODA. The effect reaches 41% for countries with a terror scale of six in the case of the ICCPR & CAT treaties. The same pattern holds true for the physical integrity index. As long as a country is in the lower third of the index, it receives increased international commitments of ODA. But as soon as the country has reached a certain level of protection of physical integrity rights, the effect of HRT ratification on ODA commitments becomes insignificant.

As discussed before, the treaty ratification measures might be endogenous. I therefore instrument treaty ratification with the distance weighted average ratification of the respective treaty group for all countries except country i and the number of ratified treaties with similar content. Table 3 shows the results for the instrumented regression. The reported F-Statistic for the first stage shows the explanatory power of the used instruments. Further the Kleibergen-Paap rank test rejects the null hypothesis of underidentification meaning that the instruments would not be correlated with the endogenous regressors and therefore lack explanatory power. Additionally, the Hansen J statistic does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, which tests their exogeneity with respect to the dependent variable i.e. their validity. The results of the previous regressions are robust to the instrumentation and the effect of international commitment at different levels of human rights protection at home becomes stronger.

In addition I tested a placebo regression with HRT commitment in $t+1$ as explanatory. Neither of the HRT measures with this timing have a significant effect on ODA allocation. The results are robust to using three-year averages. Yearly aid commitments might be volatile as negotiations between the donor and the recipient do not always occur every year. Following Neumayer (2003b) I re-run the

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previous regressions using three-year averages of all the variables. Again, the results show that ratification of HRTs is rewarded and more so in countries with a bad record of human rights abuses.

It seems plausible that bureaucrats in bilateral aid agencies would make allocation decisions in such a way. Countries with low political terror already show a respect to human rights while those with a bad record have the potential to improve their behavior substantially. However, given the empirical evidence that international commitment to human rights seldom leads to real compliance in countries with low democratic standards and a weak civil society, it is a questionable choice to reward those countries for their promises to change. The situation would be different if the increase in aid was targeted to support the country's implementation of the international commitment. This ODA could potentially help to improve their domestic human rights situation in the medium term. Aid for this aim would most likely be directed to the government and the civil society. To test whether this part of ODA causes the observed increase, I replicate the previous regressions with a new dependent variable that covers only this specific aid.[20] As I investigate only one part of ODA, the number of zeros in the dependent variable rises. This causes a skewed distribution and OLS might no longer be the most efficient estimator. I therefore use the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) method, which is known for its good performance for estimations with a large number of zeros (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).[21] The results (Tables 4 and 5) suggest that aid to the sectors most relevant for implementation of the international conventions is neither affected by an increase of international commitment to HR nor by the interaction with the actual human rights level. Given the previous result of an increase in total ODA, this finding indicates that donors increase other parts of aid as a reward to those countries that commit to international human right conventions.

Bilateral Analysis[22]

The previous analysis pooled the aid of all 26 DAC donor countries. It is admittedly doubtful that the behavior and aid allocation decisions are the same for all donors. In the literature, two groups are often explicitly separated with regards to their foreign aid strategies. The "Nordic" or like-minded countries (Neumayer, 2003b) – Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – and the largest

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[20] Sectoral data are only available since 1995; therefore the number of observations reduces substantially.
[21] The PPML estimator is widely used in the trade literature and becomes more common in other economic fields as well (e.g. Nunnenkamp et al. 2012, Dreher et al., 2013).
[22] The results can be found in the appendix.

donors: France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. While the former are usually described as more "benevolent" donors that especially take the recipient's need and merit into account, the latter are known for their more strategic aid giving – often allocating based on commercial or political interests. I will follow this distinction of donors and analyze the bilateral aid of each donor j to recipient i to evaluate how their behavior differs with regards to the recipient's international commitment to HRTs. To control for general patterns of aid allocation by the DAC donors or "herding" behavior, as additional control variable I include the total ODA to recipient i by all DAC donors except donor j. The smaller donors like Denmark have a smaller aid budget and are therefore more selective in their aid allocation, i.e., the number of countries receiving no ODA is higher than for the big donors. This leads to an increase of zero observations in the dependent variable. To account for this skewed distribution I again use the PPML method as introduced above (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The advantage of this method is that it does not require a two-step approach in order to model both the zeros and the values above zero.

Though the like-minded donors are usually assumed to be more needs and merits based in their aid allocation, the results (Table A 1, appendix) do not show a significant effect of political terror on aid allocation. This is remarkable as we observe this effect for the biggest donors (Table A 2, appendix) who are usually assumed to be more self-interest driven and care less for institutional settings in their aid allocation decision. With the exception of the United Kingdom and the United States, the big donors provide significantly less aid for countries with a higher political terror scale. The marginal effect ranges between -.16 and -.35.5 which is equivalent to a decrease of 16 to 35.5% of ODA with an increase of political terror by one category at the means of all other covariates. This translates to a reduction of German ODA commitments on average by 9 million USD (16%), of French ODA by almost 15 million USD (27%) and of Japanese ODA by 45 million USD (35.5%). Interestingly, two of the like-minded countries (Canada and Sweden) react to the recipient's international commitment to HRTs but they do not consider the political terror in the country.

In a second step I again investigate the relationship between the domestic human rights situation and international commitment to human rights with respect to the donor's reaction. Figures A 1 – A 6 (appendix) show the marginal effect of HRT ratification at different levels of political terror

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on bilateral aid allocation. These figures are based on the results of Tables 8 and 9. In general, the pattern for the previous pooled analysis is repeated, however the interaction is not statistically significant at conventional levels for most countries. The only exception is Japan. Its pattern is exactly the opposite of the other countries and suggests that HRT ratification is only met with an increase in ODA when it is a complement to actual respect for human rights. While countries with a good track record of human rights protection benefit from international commitment, those with high levels of domestic political terror cannot increase their Japanese ODA inflows by ratifying HRTs. However, the interaction is almost always statistically insignificant. It is only for the core treaties group that the positive impact of HRT ratification on ODA commitments for countries with low levels of political terror is significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless the Japanese allocation decision is remarkably different from those of the other donors analyzed.

In the group of Nordic countries, the interaction pattern is statistically significant for the Netherlands and Sweden. For Sweden the effect becomes significant at a relatively low level of political terror. It seems that Sweden rewards the commitment to HRT in general and not only for those countries with poor protection of human rights at home. A similar pattern is observable for Germany and the United Kingdom. For the US, on the other hand, international commitment seems to be unimportant independently of the domestic political terror situation. Again this contradicts the perception that the US, apart from strategic interests, generally promotes human rights protection in other countries. When comparing the Nordic countries with the big donors there is no evidence for a significantly different behavior with regards to rewarding international commitment to HRTs. In both groups, some countries (Canada and Sweden; Germany and the UK) appear to consider international ratification of HRTs in general for their aid allocation decisions. Further, in both groups the general pattern that those countries with higher political terror benefit more from ratifying HRTs is observable. The only remarkable exception is Japan, which gives a greater reward to those countries with a better human rights record for their commitment to HRTs.

VI. Conclusion

Many donor countries and especially the tax payers in these countries seem to be concerned about the extent of human rights abuses in developing countries. This can be seen by the stated aim of several

bilateral donors to base their aid allocation decision on the human rights situation in the respective country. One easily available measure for a country's formal commitment to human rights is its participation in international human rights treaties. This study shows that DAC donors take a recipient's ratification of these treaties into account in their aid allocation decisions. However, it is not only treaty ratification that is considered but also the actual human rights situation in the recipient country. At first sight it seems reasonable to reward countries for their ratification of these international conventions. Yet the data suggest that those governments who abuse human rights at home can benefit through increased ODA from DAC donors by ratifying international HRTs. This reward is probably built on the hope that the formal commitment will indeed change the government's actual behavior. However, history has shown that this hope is often not fulfilled. This implies that donors reward countries with poor human rights protection simply for signaling intents that these countries do not realize, because they lack political will or capacity. Therefore if donors want to sincerely account for human rights in their aid allocation decision they should primarily rely on information of the actual human rights situation in the recipient country provided by organizations like Amnesty International. Further, when rewarding countries for their international commitment, donors should wait until a real improvement is observable instead of providing benefits in the hope that the situation will ameliorate. This included also the recommendation to make treaty ratification not a condition of aid commitments as ratification does not necessarily imply implementation. On the other hand if donors take this international commitment seriously they should increase the amount of aid that is guided towards supporting the government in the implementation of its international commitments. This study shows that currently this type of aid does not increase after a country commits to international human rights conventions.

This finding has important ramifications for policy decisions as the current pattern of rewarding specifically those countries with bad human rights record for international commitment implicitly means that oppressive regimes are rewarded for their window dressing behavior. Interestingly I cannot find a difference in this behavior between the Nordic donors, that are known for their need and merit based aid, and the biggest donors, that are well known for their strategic aid decisions. The exception seems to be Japan for which rewards only those recipients with a good record

of human rights protection for their commitment to international human rights treaties. Given the empirical evidence on the lack of compliance with HRTs, Japan's strategy seems to be the best in terms of giving based on actual respect for human rights. As a next step it would be of interest and policy relevance to investigate whether human-rights-targeted aid might indeed help to implement international commitments on human rights protection. If this type of aid changes a government's behavior in the medium run there would be hope for the international community that a positive change towards respect for human rights in those countries where it is needed most is possible.

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Figures

Figure 1: Political Terror Score and Torture Occurrence at Year of CAT Ratification

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Treaties Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror and Physical Integrity

Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table II.2. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the distribution of political terror (left) and physical integrity (right) as fraction of 1.

Tables

Table 1: Basic fixed-effects specification, 1977-2010, OLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	0.011 [0.971]	-0.228 [0.216]	0.011 [0.971]	-0.263 [0.163]	0.014 [0.964]	-0.252 [0.175]	0.011 [0.972]	-0.246 [0.179]
Population $_{t-1}$	0.176 [0.644]	-0.344 [0.516]	0.173 [0.647]	-0.240 [0.652]	0.169 [0.653]	-0.263 [0.619]	0.144 [0.699]	-0.328 [0.522]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.032 [0.113]	0.052*** [0.007]	0.026 [0.211]	0.050*** [0.006]	0.023 [0.272]	0.048*** [0.006]	0.021 [0.294]	0.043** [0.012]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	3.293** [0.011]	3.237*** [0.008]	3.076** [0.012]	2.661** [0.017]	3.149** [0.011]	2.720** [0.017]	3.115** [0.014]	2.633** [0.021]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.091*** [0.008]		-0.091*** [0.008]		-0.098*** [0.005]		-0.100*** [0.004]	
Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$		0.029* [0.065]		0.032** [0.038]		0.034** [0.030]		0.034** [0.026]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.035 [0.108]	0.024 [0.368]				
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$					0.067* [0.062]	0.046 [0.280]		
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$							0.116* [0.058]	0.193*** [0.001]
Core Treaties excl. ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$							0.035 [0.591]	-0.050 [0.418]
Constant	13.703** [0.018]	23.788*** [0.007]	13.843** [0.016]	22.777** [0.011]	13.855** [0.015]	23.020** [0.010]	14.303** [0.014]	24.124*** [0.005]
Observations	3,631	3,001	3,631	2,913	3,631	2,913	3,631	2,913
Countries	136	142	136	134	136	134	136	134
R-squared	0.057	0.051	0.060	0.058	0.061	0.058	0.062	0.064

Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, *$p<0.1$.

Table 2: Interaction of Treaty Ratification with Human Rights Respect, 1977-2010, OLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.233* [0.069]	-0.298 [0.117]	-0.231* [0.061]	-0.207 [0.259]	-0.299** [0.024]	-0.228 [0.219]
Population $_{t-1}$	0.088 [0.801]	-0.465 [0.349]	0.103 [0.764]	-0.534 [0.285]	-0.039 [0.916]	-0.558 [0.276]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.046*** [0.009]	0.061*** [0.003]	0.042** [0.013]	0.056*** [0.004]	0.034** [0.048]	0.047** [0.015]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	0.081 [0.151]	0.077 [0.211]	0.084 [0.139]	0.101 [0.123]	0.088 [0.126]	0.094 [0.152]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.306*** [0.000]		-0.306*** [0.001]		-0.202*** [0.001]	
Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$		0.150*** [0.003]		0.138** [0.012]		0.073** [0.038]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$	-0.062** [0.020]	0.110** [0.030]				
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$	0.036*** [0.001]					
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$		-0.018*** [0.007]				
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.086* [0.060]	0.159* [0.059]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.054*** [0.006]			
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$				-0.025** [0.026]		
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$					-0.094 [0.468]	0.325** [0.030]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$					0.103** [0.021]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$						-0.035 [0.173]
Constant	19.369*** [0.001]	27.297*** [0.001]	19.135*** [0.001]	28.169*** [0.001]	21.558*** [0.001]	28.538*** [0.001]
Observations	3,574	2,862	3,574	2,941	3,591	2,951
Countries	133	131	133	138	133	138
R-squared	0.080	0.071	0.077	0.056	0.067	0.054

Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, *$p<0.1$.

Table 3: Interaction of Treaty Ratification with Human Rights Respect, 1977-2010, 2SLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	0.057 [0.843]	-0.324* [0.083]	-0.206 [0.260]	-0.242 [0.175]	0.075 [0.811]	-0.195 [0.289]
Population $_{t-1}$	-0.054 [0.886]	-0.390 [0.433]	-0.525 [0.287]	-0.374 [0.425]	-0.319 [0.443]	-0.601 [0.194]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.023 [0.256]	0.044** [0.026]	0.040** [0.050]	0.040** [0.045]	0.012 [0.631]	0.020 [0.408]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	3.197** [0.012]	2.575** [0.028]	2.524** [0.019]	2.734** [0.013]	3.302** [0.012]	2.361** [0.040]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.524*** [0.000]		-0.568*** [0.000]		-0.518*** [0.001]	
Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$		0.225*** [0.000]		0.251*** [0.000]		0.222*** [0.000]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$	-0.103 [0.145]	0.259*** [0.000]				
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$	0.075*** [0.000]					
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$		-0.031*** [0.000]				
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.132 [0.294]	0.396*** [0.000]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.118*** [0.000]			
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$				-0.053*** [0.000]		
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$					-0.760* [0.091]	1.341*** [0.000]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$					0.429*** [0.003]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$						-0.173*** [0.000]
Observations	3,627	2,909	2,909	2,909	3,627	2,909
Countries	134	132	132	132	134	132
Partial R^2	0.1098; 0.2991	0.0973; 0.3504	0.0862; 0.2123	0.0841; 0.2682	0.0884; 0.1734	0.0616; 0.1328
F-Test First Stage	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Hansen (p-value)	0.666	0.823	0.293	0.360	0.783	0.835
Kleiberg-Paap F-Statistic	17.14	11.49	10.44	10.45	9.770	5.042

Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. All treaty ratification measures are instrumented by a distance weighted spatial measure of treaty ratification of all other countries and the ratificatoin of treaties under the "penalty matters" chapter of the UN treaty database. The first partial R^2 value refers to the treaty measures instrument and the second to the interaction-instrument. The first stage F-Test controls for the power of the instruments in the first stage. The Hansen (p-value) refers to the validity of the instruments which cannot be rejected. The Kleiberg-Paap F-Statistic rejects the hypothesis of underidentification of the endogenous variables. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, *$p<0.1$.

Table 4: Government and Civil Society Commitments, 1995 - 2010, PPML

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.368* [0.086]	-0.374* [0.087]	-0.567** [0.028]	-0.367* [0.084]	-0.561** [0.026]	-0.363* [0.088]	-0.557** [0.024]
Population $_{t-1}$	-0.169 [0.820]	-0.151 [0.840]	-0.604 [0.462]	-0.177 [0.812]	-0.617 [0.450]	-0.027 [0.971]	-0.490 [0.558]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.058* [0.059]	0.057* [0.060]	0.044 [0.152]	0.057* [0.061]	0.044 [0.150]	0.059* [0.054]	0.044 [0.151]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	-1.278* [0.064]	-1.282* [0.065]	-0.950 [0.258]	-1.260* [0.064]	-0.947 [0.256]	-1.207* [0.078]	-0.859 [0.309]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	0.205*** [0.000]	0.206*** [0.000]		0.206*** [0.000]		0.205*** [0.000]	
Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$			-0.045** [0.025]		-0.045** [0.027]		-0.044** [0.033]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.005 [0.819]	0.004 [0.881]				
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$				0.013 [0.749]	0.003 [0.942]		
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$						-0.101 [0.242]	-0.104 [0.270]
Core Treaties except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$						0.071 [0.161]	0.057 [0.279]
Constant	7.855 [0.531]	7.549 [0.548]	16.865 [0.225]	7.902 [0.528]	17.061 [0.218]	5.243 [0.681]	14.766 [0.296]
Observations	1,853	1,853	1,752	1,853	1,752	1,853	1,752
Countries	119	119	119	119	119	119	119
R-squared	0.532	0.532	0.515	0.532	0.515	0.533	0.516

Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments to the Government and Civil Society Sector by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5: Government and Civil Society Commitments, Interaction Ratification and Human Rights Respect, 1995 - 2010, PPML

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.368* [0.086]	-0.367* [0.091]	0.528** [0.044]	-0.367* [0.085]	0.549** [0.030]	-0.367* [0.088]	0.556** [0.029]
Population $_{t-1}$	-0.169 [0.820]	0.026 [0.973]	-0.498 [0.560]	-0.135 [0.860]	-0.583 [0.485]	-0.103 [0.896]	-0.539 [0.524]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.058* [0.059]	0.056* [0.064]	0.044 [0.152]	0.057* [0.060]	0.045 [0.147]	0.059* [0.054]	0.046 [0.140]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	-1.278* [0.064]	1.411** [0.044]	-1.027 [0.216]	-1.290* [0.058]	-0.945 [0.256]	-1.290* [0.061]	-0.943 [0.264]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	).205*** [0.000]	.354*** [0.006]		0.286 [0.101]		0.210** [0.031]	
Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$		0.052 [0.154]	-0.022 [0.584]				
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.094 [0.116]		-0.081 [0.330]		-0.053 [0.287]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$		-0.017 [0.167]					
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$			0.006 [0.361]				
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$				0.054 [0.493]	-0.026 [0.758]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$				-0.015 [0.599]			
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$					0.007 [0.639]		
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$						-0.042 [0.802]	-0.092 [0.567]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$ * Political Terror $_{t-1}$						-0.004 [0.937]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$ * Physical Integrity $_{t-1}$							0.006 [0.832]
Constant	7.855 [0.531]	4.258 [0.751]	15.131 [0.294]	7.007 [0.591]	16.562 [0.238]	6.825 [0.608]	15.859 [0.268]
Observations	1,853	1,853	1,752	1,853	1,752	1,853	1,752
Countries	119	119	119	119	119	119	119
R-squared	0.532	0.532	0.515	0.532	0.515	0.532	0.515

Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments to the Government and Civil Society Sector by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Figure A 1: Marginal Effect of Human Rights Treaties Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror for like-minded donors

Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.3. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the percentaged distribution of political terror.

Figure A 2: Marginal Effect of Human Rights Treaties Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror for most important DAC donors

Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.4. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the percentaged distribution of political terror.

Figure A 3: Marginal Effect of Core Human Rights Treaties Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror for like-minded DAC donors

Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.3. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the percentaged distribution of political terror.

Figure A 4: Marginal Effect of Core Human Rights Treaties Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror for most important DAC donors

Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.4. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the percentaged distribution of political terror.

Figure A 5: Marginal Effect of ICCPR & CAT Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror for like-minded DAC donors

Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.3. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the percentaged distribution of political terror.

Figure A 6: Marginal Effect of ICCPR & CAT Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror for most important DAC donors


Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.4. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows the percentaged distribution of political terror.

Table A 1: Bilateral Aid like-minded countries, PPML, marginal effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Canada				Denmark		
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.740 [0.177]	-0.739 [0.178]	-0.739 [0.178]	-0.749 [0.172]	0.338 [0.413]	0.322 [0.430]	0.333 [0.413]	0.342 [0.399]
Population $_{t-1}$	-0.510 [0.756]	-0.526 [0.750]	-0.526 [0.751]	-0.685 [0.685]	1.238 [0.476]	1.193 [0.493]	1.229 [0.480]	1.305 [0.457]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.005 [0.929]	0.003 [0.961]	0.003 [0.965]	-0.009 [0.877]	0.004 [0.959]	0.006 [0.926]	0.005 [0.945]	0.011 [0.870]
DAC aid $_{t-1}$	0.872*** [0.000]	0.872*** [0.000]	0.872*** [0.000]	0.856*** [0.000]	1.180*** [0.000]	1.181*** [0.000]	1.180*** [0.000]	1.188*** [0.000]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	5.620*** [0.005]	5.567*** [0.004]	5.596*** [0.004]	5.503*** [0.005]	5.029** [0.030]	5.162** [0.028]	5.055** [0.031]	5.021** [0.032]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.197 [0.178]	-0.196 [0.182]	-0.199 [0.171]	-0.209 [0.147]	-0.225 [0.109]	-0.229 [0.105]	-0.224 [0.108]	-0.219 [0.116]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.016 [0.794]				-0.029 [0.604]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.023 [0.838]				-0.012 [0.894]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.344* [0.091]				-0.135 [0.580]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.193 [0.258]				0.071 [0.681]
Observations	3,564	3,564	3,564	3,564	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163
R-squared	0.599	0.599	0.599	0.600	0.514	0.514	0.514	0.514

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
		Netherlands				Norway		
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.168 [0.865]	-0.152 [0.878]	-0.153 [0.878]	-0.139 [0.889]	-2.301*** [0.000]	-2.297*** [0.000]	-2.286*** [0.000]	-2.277*** [0.000]
Population $_{t-1}$	5.105* [0.058]	5.135* [0.053]	5.072* [0.057]	5.246** [0.049]	-3.682* [0.083]	-3.582* [0.087]	-3.668* [0.083]	-3.565* [0.091]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.039 [0.634]	0.018 [0.825]	0.019 [0.810]	0.028 [0.716]	-0.091 [0.266]	-0.100 [0.218]	-0.101 [0.214]	-0.096 [0.235]
DAC aid $_{t-1}$	1.221*** [0.000]	1.213*** [0.000]	1.210*** [0.000]	1.218*** [0.000]	0.660*** [0.000]	0.661*** [0.000]	0.659*** [0.000]	0.669*** [0.000]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	-2.194 [0.457]	-2.925 [0.312]	-2.529 [0.390]	-2.484 [0.396]	2.976 [0.143]	2.694 [0.180]	2.801 [0.163]	2.784 [0.168]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	0.177 [0.313]	0.180 [0.303]	0.161 [0.356]	0.169 [0.331]	-0.114 [0.519]	-0.109 [0.543]	-0.120 [0.492]	-0.115 [0.510]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.155 [0.126]				0.069 [0.333]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.175 [0.219]				0.096 [0.483]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.087 [0.764]				-0.056 [0.853]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.354 [0.114]				0.198 [0.314]
Observations	3,592	3,592	3,592	3,592	3,524	3,524	3,524	3,524
R-squared	0.580	0.581	0.581	0.581	0.600	0.601	0.601	0.601

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
		Sweden		
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-3.503*** [0.001]	-3.456*** [0.001]	-3.383*** [0.002]	-3.385*** [0.002]
Population $_{t-1}$	3.367 [0.284]	3.821 [0.197]	3.494 [0.243]	3.481 [0.242]
Polity $_{t-1}$	0.158 [0.250]	0.120 [0.386]	0.106 [0.441]	0.105 [0.447]
DAC aid $_{t-1}$	0.658*** [0.001]	0.690*** [0.000]	0.670*** [0.000]	0.669*** [0.000]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	-1.532 [0.565]	-2.546 [0.315]	-2.161 [0.410]	-2.166 [0.409]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.085 [0.706]	-0.059 [0.793]	-0.114 [0.608]	-0.115 [0.606]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.275** [0.022]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.466** [0.017]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.483 [0.293]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.455* [0.079]
Observations	3,244	3,244	3,244	3,244
R-squared	0.528	0.533	0.532	0.532

Notes: Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. Shown are the marginal effects at the mean of all other covariates. UNGA voting refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid is the total aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor whose aid is analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson Pseude-Maximum-Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table A 2: Bilateral Aid important DAC countries, PPML, marginal effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Germany				France		
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.369 [0.485]	-0.363 [0.491]	-0.361 [0.496]	-0.372 [0.483]	0.161 [0.695]	0.162 [0.693]	0.161 [0.695]	0.162 [0.693]
Population $_{t-1}$	-0.440 [0.647]	-0.388 [0.688]	-0.419 [0.664]	-0.544 [0.574]	-4.978*** [0.002]	-4.982*** [0.002]	-4.978*** [0.002]	-4.966*** [0.002]
Polity $_{t-1}$	-0.011 [0.719]	-0.025 [0.421]	-0.025 [0.419]	-0.033 [0.296]	0.056 [0.267]	0.059 [0.251]	0.056 [0.282]	0.057 [0.280]
DAC aid $_{t-1}$	0.434*** [0.000]	0.427*** [0.000]	0.427*** [0.000]	0.418*** [0.000]	0.457*** [0.000]	0.458*** [0.000]	0.457*** [0.000]	0.458*** [0.000]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	2.016* [0.071]	1.690 [0.133]	1.883* [0.095]	1.816 [0.107]	3.286* [0.062]	3.367* [0.056]	3.286* [0.062]	3.296* [0.059]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.165** [0.021]	-0.164** [0.023]	-0.176** [0.012]	-0.184*** [0.008]	-0.275*** [0.002]	-0.275*** [0.002]	-0.275*** [0.002]	-0.274*** [0.003]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.084** [0.012]				-0.017 [0.744]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.103** [0.040]				0.000 [0.996]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.317** [0.017]				-0.020 [0.905]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.036 [0.676]				0.014 [0.919]
Observations	3,622	3,622	3,622	3,622	3,626	3,626	3,626	3,626
R-squared	0.780	0.780	0.780	0.780	0.647	0.647	0.647	0.647

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
		United Kingdom				Japan		
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-1.301* [0.081]	-1.289* [0.083]	-1.277* [0.086]	-1.297* [0.081]	0.947 [0.144]	0.953 [0.140]	0.960 [0.137]	0.957 [0.136]
Population $_{t-1}$	-3.706* [0.063]	-3.721* [0.058]	-3.721* [0.058]	-3.943** [0.046]	0.087 [0.953]	0.115 [0.938]	0.112 [0.939]	0.082 [0.954]
Polity $_{t-1}$	-0.102 [0.171]	-0.129* [0.082]	-0.135* [0.067]	-0.156** [0.034]	-0.010 [0.807]	-0.020 [0.631]	-0.029 [0.484]	-0.032 [0.462]
DAC aid $_{t-1}$	0.902*** [0.000]	0.892*** [0.000]	0.887*** [0.000]	0.867*** [0.000]	0.384*** [0.000]	0.376*** [0.000]	0.372*** [0.001]	0.369*** [0.001]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	5.438* [0.086]	4.627 [0.122]	5.092* [0.096]	4.889 [0.110]	3.555* [0.095]	3.373 [0.111]	3.394 [0.107]	3.382 [0.108]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.075 [0.657]	-0.068 [0.691]	-0.098 [0.557]	-0.116 [0.485]	-0.365*** [0.000]	-0.365*** [0.000]	-0.382*** [0.000]	-0.384*** [0.000]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.166* [0.050]				0.060 [0.267]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.256* [0.074]				0.146* [0.065]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.730** [0.017]				0.210 [0.278]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.054 [0.822]				0.105 [0.311]
Observations	3,588	3,588	3,588	3,588	3,627	3,627	3,627	3,627
R-squared	0.566	0.566	0.566	0.567	0.586	0.586	0.587	0.587

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
		United States		
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-1.029 [0.211]	-1.018 [0.219]	-1.032 [0.211]	-1.024 [0.217]
Population $_{t-1}$	-6.834** [0.014]	-6.966** [0.013]	-6.842** [0.014]	-6.775** [0.017]
Polity $_{t-1}$	-0.120 [0.212]	-0.095 [0.307]	-0.108 [0.236]	-0.103 [0.277]
DAC aid $_{t-1}$	0.790*** [0.000]	0.802*** [0.000]	0.796*** [0.000]	0.801*** [0.000]
UNGA voting $_{t-1}$	1.182 [0.578]	0.815 [0.708]	1.079 [0.617]	1.095 [0.613]
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.195 [0.314]	-0.209 [0.279]	-0.188 [0.329]	-0.184 [0.341]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		-0.165* [0.099]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.106 [0.476]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.215 [0.502]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.034 [0.895]
Observations	3,597	3,597	3,597	3,597
R-squared	0.644	0.644	0.643	0.643

Notes: Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. Shown are the marginal effects at the mean of all other covariates. UNGA voting refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid is the total aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor whose aid is analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson Pseude-Maximum-Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table A 3: Bilateral aid like-minded countries, interaction, PPML

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			Canada				Denmark	
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.016 [0.178]	-0.042** [0.046]	-0.048* [0.053]	-0.030 [0.148]	-0.056 [0.109]	-0.183*** [0.002]	-0.193*** [0.002]	-0.147*** [0.001]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		-0.010 [0.145]				-0.065*** [0.008]		
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$		0.004* [0.069]				0.021*** [0.004]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.021 [0.145]				-0.103** [0.014]	
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.008* [0.077]				0.036*** [0.007]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.008 [0.844]				-0.322*** [0.003]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$				0.013 [0.306]				0.100*** [0.004]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.015 [0.284]				0.025 [0.551]
Constant	2.169 [0.344]	2.488 [0.281]	2.490 [0.279]	2.663 [0.256]	-8.853 [0.220]	-8.200 [0.252]	-8.947 [0.213]	-8.731 [0.233]
Observations	3,564	3,564	3,564	3,564	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163
R-squared	0.599	0.600	0.601	0.600	0.514	0.515	0.514	0.515

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
			Netherlands				Norway	
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	0.016 [0.313]	-0.073*** [0.009]	-0.086*** [0.004]	-0.038 [0.112]	-0.017 [0.520]	-0.047 [0.296]	-0.078 [0.142]	-0.049 [0.163]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		-0.028** [0.047]				-0.004 [0.846]		
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$		0.015*** [0.000]				0.005 [0.365]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.060*** [0.009]				-0.027 [0.452]	
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.027*** [0.000]				0.015 [0.170]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.173*** [0.002]				-0.101 [0.212]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$				0.056*** [0.001]				0.032 [0.201]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.037* [0.067]				0.031 [0.278]
Constant	-7.288* [0.093]	-6.524 [0.118]	-6.568 [0.116]	-6.992 [0.106]	12.370** [0.029]	12.272** [0.028]	12.455** [0.027]	12.278** [0.030]
Observations	3,592	3,592	3,592	3,592	3,524	3,524	3,524	3,524
R-squared	0.580	0.584	0.583	0.582	0.600	0.600	0.600	0.601

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
			Sweden	
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.013 [0.706]	-0.082 [0.260]	-0.086 [0.304]	-0.075 [0.202]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.013 [0.647]		
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$		0.011 [0.208]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			0.029 [0.598]	
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.016 [0.337]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.074 [0.580]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$				0.052 [0.206]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.073* [0.067]
Constant	-4.049 [0.632]	-4.848 [0.551]	-4.507 [0.579]	-4.263 [0.597]
Observations	3,244	3,244	3,244	3,244
R-squared	0.528	0.534	0.533	0.533

Notes: All control variables included but not shown here. Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. UNGA voting refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid is the total aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor whose aid is analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table A 4: Bilateral aid important DAC countries, interaction, PPML

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Germany				France		
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.010** [0.021]	-0.019** [0.016]	-0.021*** [0.008]	-0.016** [0.024]	-0.019*** [0.002]	-0.033** [0.017]	-0.033* [0.055]	-0.028** [0.015]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		0.001 [0.679]				-0.007 [0.250]		
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$		0.001* [0.081]				0.002 [0.217]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.000 [0.968]				-0.009 [0.480]	
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.002* [0.072]				0.003 [0.375]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				0.007 [0.616]				-0.026 [0.382]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$				0.005 [0.222]				0.009 [0.336]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.002 [0.706]				0.002 [0.873]
Constant	2.272** [0.011]	2.292** [0.010]	2.314*** [0.009]	2.435*** [0.006]	7.641*** [0.000]	7.811*** [0.000]	7.763*** [0.000]	7.747*** [0.000]
Observations	3,622	3,622	3,622	3,622	3,626	3,626	3,626	3,626
R-squared	0.780	0.780	0.780	0.780	0.647	0.647	0.647	0.647

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
		United Kingdom				Japan		
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.006 [0.657]	-0.045* [0.054]	-0.054** [0.033]	-0.030 [0.126]	-0.023*** [0.000]	-0.006 [0.612]	0.002 [0.853]	-0.014 [0.186]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		-0.004 [0.684]				0.011*** [0.010]		
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$		0.007** [0.019]				-0.003** [0.038]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.012 [0.531]				0.028*** [0.000]	
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.012** [0.019]				-0.007*** [0.008]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.000 [0.995]				0.043** [0.049]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$				0.021* [0.081]				-0.010 [0.191]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.003 [0.873]				0.006 [0.353]
Constant	5.719** [0.013]	6.032*** [0.007]	6.075*** [0.006]	6.301*** [0.006]	1.991 [0.355]	1.721 [0.421]	1.670 [0.432]	1.832 [0.366]
Observations	3,588	3,588	3,588	3,588	3,627	3,627	3,627	3,627
R-squared	0.566	0.568	0.568	0.568	0.586	0.588	0.590	0.588

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
		United States		
Political Terror $_{t-1}$	-0.015 [0.314]	-0.021 [0.320]	-0.018 [0.463]	-0.021 [0.272]
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$		-0.015 [0.127]		
Human Rights Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$		0.001 [0.744]		
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$			-0.010 [0.539]	
Core Treaties $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$			0.001 [0.850]	
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.038 [0.384]
ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$*Political Terror $_{t-1}$				0.008 [0.507]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT $_{t-1}$				-0.002 [0.913]
Constant	10.808*** [0.002]	11.124*** [0.002]	10.880*** [0.002]	10.855*** [0.003]
Observations	3,597	3,597	3,597	3,597
R-squared	0.644	0.644	0.644	0.644

Notes: All control variables included but not shown here. Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. UNGA voting refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid is the total aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor whose aid is analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table A 5: List of Human Rights Core Treaties

Instrument	Date of Adotion
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	21 December 1965
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16 December 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	16 December 1966
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	18 December 1979
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	10 December 1984
Convention on the Rights of the Child	20 November 1989
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	18 December 1990
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	20 December 2006
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	13 December 2006

Table A 6: List of Selected Treaties from "Penalty Matters" Chapter, Used for Human Rights Instrumentation

Treaty	Date of Adoption
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.	07 September 1956
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.	17 December 1979
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.	4 December 1989
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.	14 December 1973
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.	9 December 1994
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.	17 July 1998

Table A 7: Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DAC ODA	3,631	503,000,000	1,000,000,000	0	24,000,000,000
GDP p.c.	3,626	2404.72	4125.78	54.51	61,374.75
Population	3,631	37,800,000	145,000,000	61,742.40	1,340,000,000
Polity	3,417	4.99	3.05	0	10
UNGA Voting	3,631	0.58	0.06	0.42	0.80
Political Terror	3,612	2.66	1.03	1	5
Physical Integrity	3,009	4.31	2.13	0	8
Human Rights Convention Ratification	3,631	6.50	3.86	0	19
Core Treaty Ratification	3,631	4.11	2.20	0	9
ICCPR & CAT Ratification	3,631	1.08	0.83	0	2
Core Treaties except ICCPR & CAT Ratification	3,631	3.03	1.49	0	7
Other Treaties (Instrument) Ratified	3,631	1.86	1.45	0	6
Spatial Effect Human Rights Convention Ratification	3,628	5.96	2.71	1.44	11.73
Spatial Effect Core Treaty Ratification	3,628	3.74	1.57	0.79	6.40
Spatial Effect ICCPR & CAT Ratification	3,628	1.01	0.44	0.17	1.72

Table A 8: Variables and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
DAC ODA commitments (log)	Total DAC ODA commitments to country i in year t in constant 2011 US$, logged	OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, OECD (2013a)
DAC ODA commitments to government and civil society	DAC ODA commitments for government and civil society to country i in year t in constant 2011 US$	OECD Creditor Reposting System, OECD (2013b)
GDP per capita (log)	GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$, logged	World Bank, World Development Indicators (2013)
Population (log)	Total population, logged	
Imputed Polity	With Freedom House Civil Liberties index imputed Polity IV. Index ranges from $0-10$ where 0 reflects least democratic and 10 most democratic.	Teorell et al. (2011)
UNGA	Measure for recipient i's voting in line with either the G5 (measured as the average of votin in line with each G5 country) or an individual donor j in the UN General Assambly.	Dreher and Sturm (2012)
Political Terror	Measures of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year ranging from 1 to 5. The data used for the index come from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. The different values of the index are: 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances,and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, forpolitical views is accepted. 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.	Gibney, Cornett, and Wood (2013)
Physical Integrity Index	This is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).	The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards (2010)
Human Rights Treaty Ratification	Count measure of ratification of conventions and optional protocols listed under Chapter IV "Human Rights" of the UN Treaty Database, excluding: *Agreement establishing the Fund for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean* as it has only a regional focus and *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure* as it was adopted only in 2011	United Nations Treaty Database (2013)
Core Treaty Ratification	Count measure of ratification of the nine core treaties on human rights (see conventions in Table A II.5)	
ICCPR & CAT Ratification	Count measure on the ratification of the ICCPR and the CAT	